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**EAST MEETS WEST ONCE AGAIN: A QUANTITATIVE COMPARATIVE
APPROACH OF RELIGIOSITY IN EUROPE OVER THE LAST TWO DECADES**

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Abstract: Theoretically placeable within the framework of the secularization versus post-secularism debate, this research employs an aggregated religiosity index as an instrument to compare Western and former Communist Eastern Europe during the globalization era in terms of area trends in religiosity. Structured in eighteen differently weighted components corresponding to three core dimensions of religiosity, i.e. beliefs, practice, and affiliation, the index confirms that over the past decade, while in the West (and Central Europe as well) secularization trends have continued, albeit at different rates and content variations, globalization seems to have finally “stepped in” in the East, where the spectacular religious revival of the 1990s has been considerably slowed down, apparently entering a plateau phase, although the remarkable both denominational and religiosity diversity in the area urges to caution in any generalizing statements.

Key Words: religiosity, secularization, West, Eastern Europe, post-communism, globalization.

Introduction

Contextually subsumable to the secularization debate, one “as old as sociology itself”¹, within the narrower and updated secularism vs. post-secularism dichotomy, the underlying research aims at comparing in a standardized manner Eastern and Western Europe in terms of trends in religiosity manifested over the last two decades. In the context of specialized field literature, I consider this specific topic as still inadequately covered by sociologists of religion, and, among Romanian scholars, virtually unaddressed; aside from the quantitatively spectacular body of literature dedicated to the secularization phenomenon characterizing Western Europe, the recent years have indeed witnessed a rapidly growing number of area studies on religiosity in Eastern Europe, but explicit, self-standing, aggregate East-West comparisons of contemporary trends in religiosity trends few in number².

Directly conditioning my general hypothesis, the East-West delineation employed in this research is mainly operational, based on a combination of geographical, political, cultural and religious criteria. Thus, by “East” I mean the former Communist states of (the geographically defined) Eastern and Central Europe, the Western Balkans included, plus, for mainly religious reasons, Greece and Turkey. Religiously very diverse (from the dominantly Protestant former East Germany to the Muslim-majority Turkey, and from the overwhelmingly Catholic Poland to mainly Orthodox Romania), most of these states share a Communist background, institutionally expressed in memberships in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and in the Warsaw Pact, and an integration into the globalization processes starting at the beginning of the 1990s. Oppositely and defined residually, the “West” encompasses in my operational delimitation the countries of the former “Free Europe”, with Roman Catholic and Protestant majorities, many of them EEC/ and NATO members.




Fig. 1: “East”-“West” conventional delineation of the research

Starting from this area delineation, my research hypothesis states that, while the abolition of all former Communist restrictions on religious life and manifestation led in the '90s to a significant discrepancy of religiosity trends between East (generally ascending) and West (generally descending), the last decade should have witnessed a visible reduction of the previous discrepancy, following the Eastern European countries' progressive integration into the secularizing globalization processes³ and their subsequent aligning to the Western pattern. As such, for the last decade I expect East European religiosity in general terms to have evolved somewhere on the continuum between: at the minimum having slowed down its previous increase, and at the maximum having even declined.

Methodologically, my purely quantitative and subjective approach relies on the data provided by the European Values Study (EVS) waves of 1990, 1999 and 2008⁴, which ensure a standardized approach not only among countries, but also along different moments in time, as such preferable to any cross-country comparison of differently operated national polls or objective country data. In regard to representativeness, the EVS series satisfactorily covers, over at least two waves, 18 Western, respectively 17 Eastern countries. In this context, the major challenge rests in constructing an instrument to diachronically and comparatively assess religiosity in an aggregated numerical expression.

In the field of scholarly work, while quantification of religiosity is quasi-unanimously believed possible, no consensus has yet been reached on what exactly to measure⁵, the number and variety of proposed items being spectacular: beliefs, formal and/or informal affiliation, church attendance, holy texts study, prayer, ritual initiation, religious knowledge, canonical conformity, religious socialization, religiously-prescribed principles, norms and values, etc. In this context, the nowadays predominant approach, conceptualizing religiosity as multidimensional⁶, has progressively gained ground since the beginning of the 1960s, when, among the eponymous names of sociologists of religion, Charles Y. Glock⁷ (probably inspired by Yoshio Fukuyama⁸) developed a model of religiosity as encompassing five dimensions, interrelated, but varying more or less autonomously: ideological (represented by the individual's adherence to religion-specific beliefs); intellectual (referring to religious knowledge); ritualistic (referring to religious behavior, including church attendance); experiential (meaning experiences modeling religious feelings); consequential (*i.e.* consequences of the previous four dimensions on the individual's daily existence). Almost simultaneously, but from a different perspective, Lenski⁹ focused on four core dimensions - doctrinal orthodoxy, devotionism, associational religiosity (*i.e.* manifested within the church framework), and communal religiosity (*i.e.* outside of the church setting), while, to offer a last example, Cornwall *et al.*¹⁰ dissociated more than two decades later four main components of religiosity: cognitive (or orthodoxy, referring to the religious beliefs); affective

(referring to feelings towards religious beings, objects or institutions); behavioral (expressed in church attendance, frequency of praying, scripture study, or religious and ethical behaviors); peripheral (encompassing four subcomponents - intellectual/knowledge, communal involvement, experiential, and consequential).

Starting from the currently dominant model of religiosity as comprising three dimensions, i.e. beliefs, practice and affiliation¹¹, the instrument I shall employ below for measuring country trends in religiosity¹² correspondingly gathers 18 differently weighted variables¹³ as measured along the last three EVS waves: beliefs (in God, life after death, in Heaven, Hell, sin), self-identification as religious, attributed importance of God in life, practice (prayer, church attendance), Church guidance (moral, family, spiritual, social), religious services attributed importance (at birth, marriage, and death), respectively religious affiliation.

Religiosity dimension (weight)	Variable – poll question	Answer measuring (% of valid answers)	Weight within AIR (%)
I. Beliefs (33.33%)	I.1 <i>Do you believe in God?</i>	% “yes”	33.33/2
	I.2 <i>Are you a religious person (regardless of church attendance)?</i>	% “yes, religious”	33.33/2/6
	I.3 <i>How important is God in your life?</i>	$\sum \% (6+7+8+9+10)^a$	33.33/2/6
	I.4 <i>Do you believe in life after death?</i>	% “yes”	33.33/2/6
	I.5 <i>Do you believe in Heaven?</i>	% “yes”	33.33/2/6
	I.6 <i>Do you believe in Hell?</i>	% “yes”	33.33/2/6
	I.7 <i>Do you believe in sin?</i>	% “yes”	33.33/2/6
II. Practice & Church-orientation (33.33%)	II.1 <i>Do you take some moments of prayer/meditation?</i>	% “yes”	33.33/3
	II.2 <i>How often do you attend religious services (apart from weddings, funerals, christenings)?</i>	$\sum \% \text{ at least once a month}^b$	33.33/3
	II.3 <i>How much confidence do you have in the Church?</i>	$\sum \% \text{ “a great deal” + “quite a lot”}$	33.33/3/3
	II.4.a <i>Church answers adequately to moral problems?</i>	% “yes”	33.33/3/12
	II.4.b <i>Church answers adequately to family life problems</i>	% “yes”	33.33/3/12
	II.4.c <i>Church answers adequately to spiritual needs</i>	% “yes”	33.33/3/12
	II.4.d <i>Church answers adequately to social problems</i>	% “yes”	33.33/3/12
	II.5.a <i>Do you think religious services are important at birth?</i>	% “yes”	33.33/3/9
	II.5.b <i>Do you think religious services are important at marriage?</i>	% “yes”	33.33/3/9
	II.5.c <i>Do you think religious services are important at death?</i>	% “yes”	33.33/3/9
III. Affiliation (33.33%)	III. <i>Do you belong to a religious denomination?</i>	% “yes”	33.33

on a scale from 1 = “not at all” to 10 = “very”;

^b i.e. % “more than once a week” + % “once a week” + % “once a month”

Table 1: EVS derived 18-question aggregated religiosity index (ARI) structure¹⁴

Thus, in terms of the classic, albeit differently expressed among scholars, dichotomy subjective vs. objective dimensions of religiosity¹⁵, the index encompasses both the explicit, public, and the implicit, private, components, exploring both “believing” and “belonging”, respectively both religious group involvement and religious individual orientation. In this approach, although not properly, nor entirely, referring to actual religious practice, the questions regarding church moral, family, spiritual and social guidance, confidence in church, and the attributed importance of religious services at major life events have been included on the rationale of what Kluckhohn has termed “value orientation”¹⁶, as an intermediary link between values (in this case religious beliefs) and behavior (*i.e.* the religious practice), thus also indicating the degree of church-oriented devotionism.

Admittedly, the religiosity index’s heuristic value is limited in three main regards. Firstly, against any temptation towards cross-country comparisons, the index serves exclusively longitudinal comparisons, *i.e.* of religiosity at different moments in time for the same unit. The main obstacle in the way of transversal comparisons lies in the multitude of inter-religious doctrinal normative and prescriptive differences, ranging from the different importance assigned to church attendance (*e.g.* highest among Catholics) to the significance of a religious service at birth (*e.g.* lowest among Muslims). Subsequently, an optimization of cross-country comparisons would require at least a (dominant-) religion-specific reweighting of the index’s components, in an enterprise that entirely exceeds the goal of this study.

Secondly, being derived from a poll, the data underpinning the research remain fundamentally subjective and hence susceptible to all well known risks associated with such a research method¹⁷. I argue however that, being developed as an instrument for longitudinal comparisons, the index remains only marginally affected by this potential shortcoming, unless it could be demonstrated that social desirability or other related methodological biases vary significantly in time within the same geographical area surveyed.

Thirdly, and tributary to the content limits of the EVS questionnaires, the developed index holistically measures religiosity trends in a strictly numerical approach (*i.e.* counting, weighting and integrating percentages of categories of respondents to different questions), without qualitatively exploring the nature of the aggregated variation of religiosity in terms of doctrinal (un-)orthodoxy in the otherwise extremely relevant contemporary context of a heterodox “individualization”¹⁸ of beliefs, with people believing more and more in what they choose rather than in what religious canons tell them to believe, in a phenomenon acknowledged and labelled by scholars in abundant versions such as “diffused religiosity/spirituality”, “hybridization”, “bricolage”, “syncretism”, “invisible religion”, “religion à la carte” “self-made religion”, etc.¹⁹

Finally, as a last preliminary remark, the research is limited to a purely descriptive profile, comparatively exploring the numerical manifestations of religiosity in the globalization era without any inquiry into the country-specific causes and factors determining one trend or another, aside from the generally hypothesized secularizing effects of globalization as a form of modernization.

Aggregated trends of religiosity in Europe by area and decade

The calculation of ARI values for 18 Western and 17 Eastern European countries does not suggest an infallible clear-cut West-East delineation in terms of overall trends in religiosity for 1990-2008, except for the country ARI average of each area (see table below), which, being un-weighted, serves a purely orienting, and rather didactical than analytical, purpose.

EVS wave sample	1990	1999	2008	Trend (R ²)
Austria	71.94	71.31	65.19	▼ (.8193)
Belgium	58.85	56.28	48.02	▼ (.9157)
Denmark	56.14	57.78	56.30	▲ (.0078)
Finland	65.80	68.06	59.51	▼ (.5039)
France	49.70	46.63	42.79	▼ (.9959)
Germany West	67.43	65.49	61.63	▼ (.9648)
Great Britain	55.76	51.53	51.13	▼ (.8143)
Iceland	69.49	69.95	65.73	▼ (.6595)
Ireland	88.28	84.87	78.70	▼ (.9731)
Italy	75.04	77.13	74.65	▼ (.0214)
Luxembourg		58.19	54.02	▼
Malta	93.57	93.35	91.95	▼ (.8497)
Netherlands	50.08	46.52	50.17	▲ (.0005)
Northern Ireland	84.41	78.03	76.22	▼ (.9060)
Norway	61.59		55.63	▼ (.8497)
Portugal	70.83	78.91	75.78	▲ (.3691)
Spain	69.33	67.14	61.03	▼ (.9308)
Sweden	50.33	49.92	45.94	▼ (.8194)
(country average)	66.97	65.94	61.91	▼ (.8951)
σ	13.19	13.77	13.23	

EVS wave sample	1990	1999	2008	Trend (R ²)
Belarus		54.84	65.13	▲
Bulgaria	32.48	52.93	56.53	▲ (.8594)
Croatia		77.43	73.09	▼
Czech Republic	34.19	33.81	29.07	▼ (.8053)
Estonia		34.43	36.54	▲
Germany East	33.27	27.05	19.71	▼ (.9977)
Greece		75.09	79.55	▲
Hungary	52.96	51.51	50.43	▼ (.9929)
Latvia	48.97 ^a	57.68	60.43	▲ (.9173)
Lithuania		71.72	73.72	▲
Poland	89.84	88.33	86.15	▼ (.9891)
Romania	77.63	86.92	87.69	▲ (.8070)
Russia		49.18	58.19	▲
Slovakia	63.65	71.05	72.35	▲ (.8592)
Slovenia	56.93	55.09	57.21	▲ (.0148)
Turkey		86.67	88.69	▲
Ukraine		57.71	70.20	▲
(country average)	54.43	60.67	62.62	▲ (.9162)
σ	20.16	18.95	20.04	

^a Does not include God's attributed importance in respondents' lives. The remaining beliefs have been re-weighted proportionally.

“▼” = descending regression line; “▲” = ascending; “/” = no data.

Table 2: Overview of Western and Eastern European country religiosity trends by EVS aggregated 18-questions index

Thus, on the one hand, the West witnessed a generally declining trend, the only regression-line qualifiable exceptions being Denmark, Portugal (both displaying inverted “V”-shaped trends) and the Netherlands (a clear “V”), with overall variations actually minor in both Denmark and Netherlands, whose 1990 and 2008 ARIs are almost equal in value. On the other hand, the conventionally defined “East” represents a visibly heterogeneous area, recognizable as such even in the standard deviation values: among the countries covered by the 1990 EVS wave, religiosity increased in five, but decreased in four countries, the latter group, including the former East Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic,

and Hungary, situated compactly in the neighborhood of the West; finally, six out of the seven Eastern countries covered only by the last two EVS waves suggest a religious revival, with the exception of Croatia.

A decade-by-decade comparison alternatively seems to offer a more clarifying view on area patterns of religiosity. Thus, over the 1990s, the trends of religiosity in the West descended, with the five exceptions of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Italy and Portugal, whose sources of religious revitalization were nevertheless considerably diverse:

	Beliefs							Practice		Church confid.	Church guidance				Rel. serv. importance			DR	
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	Pray	Church attd.		a	b	c	d	a	b	c		
DEN	▲	▼	◀▶	▲	◀▶	▲	▼	▲	▲	▲	◀▶	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼	◀▶	▼
FIN	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	◀▶	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	◀▶	▲
ICE	◀▶	◀▶	▲	▼	▲	▲	▼	▲	▲	▼	▲	▲	▼	▲	▲	▲	▼	▲	▼
ITA	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲
PRT	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼	▲	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲

▲ = increase; ▼ = decrease; ◀▶ = variation <1%

Table 3: Religious revival sources for Western countries with 1990s ARI increase

Thus, except for Portugal, the only common denominator was the religious affiliation drop²⁰, the main factor of ARI's increase being the other dimensions of religiosity, especially practice and church guidance for the Northern Protestant countries. In Italy, all 17 religiosity components, other than religious affiliation increased. Finally, the revival of Portugal was mainly the result of significantly more people (88.6 compared to 78.6%) claiming a religious affiliation, while somehow paradoxically, church guidance mostly declined.

	Beliefs							Practice		Church confid.	Church guidance				Rel. serv. importance			DR
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	Pray	Church attd.		a	b	c	d	a	b	c	
CZE	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼
EGE	▼	▼	▼	▼	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼
HUN	▲	◀▶	▲	▲	◀▶	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	◀▶
POL	◀▶	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	◀▶	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	◀▶	▲	◀▶	◀▶
SLV	▲	▼	▲	▲	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲
BLG	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▲	▲	▼	▲	◀▶	▼	◀▶	▲	▲	▲
LAT	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲
ROM	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲
SLK	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	◀▶	▲	◀▶	▲

▲ = increase; ▼ = decrease; ◀▶ = variation <1%

Table 4: Religiosity components' patterns in Eastern Europe over the 1990s

By comparison, the variation of religiosity in the East was extremely diverse, spread between the two extreme cases of East Germany (where 17 out of the 18 variables registered declines) and Romania (where all 18 items registered value increases). Separated *a priori* by the trends in aggregate index value, the two main Eastern European clusters above are further distinguishable mainly by (a) the religious affiliation trend; and (b)

the inside-outside Church manifestation of religiosity: in the narrowly defined *Mitteleuropa*, Church attendance rates, church guidance and the perceived importance of religious services declined, while beliefs varied extremely, with no clearly distinguishable patterns. Oppositely, in the remaining four countries, beliefs, church attendance and confidence in Church increased numerically, with no exception, as did religious affiliation (as the main factor of ARI trends), while prayer, church guidance and religious services importance varied significantly.

Over the last decade, ARI_{EVS} -derived trends highlight at first glance a spectacularly clear-cut frontier, which would roughly preserve the hypothesis-embedded East-West delineation, with the exception of the *Mitteleuropa* cluster, situated in the proximity to the West and fitting the pattern of its religiosity: with the sole exception of the Netherlands, all Western European countries (Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Iceland and Finland included) witnessed a religiosity in religiosity (along the overwhelming majority of components), while the remaining Eastern European countries were marked, to different degrees and in different compositions, by a religious revival:




Fig. 2: The 2000s country ARI_{EVS} trend map

Of the two exceptions, the Netherlands 1990–2008 “V”-shaped trend, whose index registered a overall 3.65 increase on behalf of 16 out of its 18 components, seems the most intriguing, one all the more so considering that other authors not even explicitly emphasized that “there is no trace of religious revival in the Netherlands”²¹, while others, stressing the steady decline of religious organization, beliefs and practice, estimating that by 2020, no less than 75% of the Dutch people will be religiously unaffiliated²², I can only interpret the ARI figures as a contextual resultant of possibly three factors: the Dutch EVS sample’s expansion from 451 in

1999 to 811 in 2008 in terms of a possible representativeness increase; the fact that the apparent religiosity increase actually only manifested among non-Catholics corroborated with the religious denominations proportion variation within the EVS 1999 and 2008 samples (Roman Catholics were downsized from 57.9% to 49%, while, the proportions of Protestants and adherents to Free Church / non-denominational churches increased from 22.4 to 26%, respectively from 11.1 to 17.1%); a possible cohort effect influence within the 1999 and 2008 samples.

In Eastern Europe, the 2000s overall pattern has remained equally complex: in the first cluster of the table below, the declining trend of the previous decade has continued and been consolidated, on behalf of essentially all religiosity components, except for the beliefs, which maintained their previous very diverse pattern; the second cluster, grouping the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, highlights a continued religious revival, but at significantly lower rates than during the '90s, due to many of the components' trend reversal from positive to negative (or stagnating); the third cluster, comprising Russia, Ukraine and Belarus witnessed a spectacular and generalized religiosity numerical increase in the overwhelming majority of components, at a rate comparable to the previous cluster in the '90s; finally, the residual cluster of Greece and Turkey has been marked by an increase of religious affiliation, but diverse evolutions along the other religiosity (sub-) dimensions, in a trend that, judging by ARI variation rates and content, looks extremely similar to the one of the second cluster, with whose countries they share as a rule NATO and, for Greece, also EU membership.

	Beliefs							Practice		Church confid.	Church guidance				Rel. serv. importance			DR.
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	Pray	Church attd.		a	b	c	d	a	b	c	
CZE	▼	▼	▲	▼	▲	▲	▼	▼	◄►	◄►	▼	▼	▼	▲	▼	▼	▼	▼
EGE	▼	▼	▲	▲	▼	▼	▼	◄►	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▲	▼	▼	▼	▼
HUN	▲	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼
POL	▼	▼	▼	▼	◄►	▲	▲	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	◄►	◄►	◄►	◄►
SLV	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▲	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼
HRV	▼	▲	▲	▲	▼	▲	▲	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼
SLK	◄►	▲	▲	▼	▲	▲	▼	▲	◄►	▼	▼	▼	▼	▲	▲	◄►	▼	▲
BLG	▲	▲	▼	▼	▲	▲	▼	▼	▼	▲	▼	▼	▼	◄►	▼	▼	▼	◄►
ROM	▲	▼	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼	▲	▼	▼	◄►	▼	◄►	◄►	◄►	◄►
EST	◄►	▲	▲	▼	▲	▲	▲	▼	◄►	▼	▲	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	▲
LAT	▼	◄►	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼	▼	▼	▲	▼	▲	▲	▼	▼	▼	▲
LIT	▲	▲	▼	▲	▼	▼	▼	▲	▼	▲	▲	▼	▲	▲	◄►	▲	◄►	▲
BLR	▲	▼	▲	▲	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲
RUS	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	◄►	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲
UKR	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▲	▲	▲	▲	◄►	▲	▲	◄►	▲	▲	▲	▲
GRE	▲	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼	▲	▲	▲	◄►	▲	▲	▼	▼	▼	▲	▲	▲
TUR	▲	▼	◄►	▲	▲	▲	◄►	▲	▼	▲	▲	▲	▼	▼	▲	▼	▲	▲

▲ = increase; ▼ = decrease; ◄► = variation <1%

Table 5: Religiosity components patterns in Eastern Europe over the 2000s

Although built differently to a considerable degree and comprising 12 components, an analogous ARI derived from the 1991, 1998 and 2008

waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) confirms the above identified trends, including the exceptions represented by the Netherlands and Slovenia²³:

Poll (wave) country	EVS (‘90)	ISSP (‘91)	EVS (‘99)	ISSP (‘98)	EVS (‘08)	ISSP (‘08)
Austria	71.94	56.47	71.31	55.77	65.19	49.03
Czech Rep.	34.19		33.81	32.81	29.07	24.31
Denmark	56.14		57.78	43.86	56.30	41.68
France	49.70		46.63	34.42	42.97	33.65
East Germany	33.27	20.54	27.05	21.23	19.71	15.46
West Germany	67.43	52.86	65.49	50.77	61.63	50.80
Great Britain	55.76	44.31	51.53	39.64	51.13	37.37
Hungary	52.96	49.08	51.51	44.01	50.43	44.40
Ireland	88.28	76.37	84.87	75.89	78.70	69.54
Italy	75.04	65.72	77.13	66.25	74.65	65.01
Latvia	48.97		57.68	42.29	60.43	37.95
N. Ireland	84.41	73.34	78.03	67.84	76.22	64.96
Netherlands	50.08	35.86	46.52	35.50	50.17	38.40
Norway	61.59	49.96		46.98	55.63	42.36
Poland	89.84	73.83	88.33	73.23	86.15	67.78
Portugal	70.83		78.91	68.04	75.78	61.32
Russia		21.16	49.18	37.23	58.19	39.30
Slovakia	63.65		71.05	58.55	72.35	58.82
Slovenia	56.93	46.63	55.09	43.25	57.21	48.28
Spain	69.33		67.14	55.38	61.03	49.44
<i>comparable cases (No.)</i>	12		19		20	
<i>correl. (Pearson)</i>	+.9817		+.9798		+.9617	

Table 6: Correlation of 18-question ESP- and 12-question ISSP-derived ARIs by poll wave
(country selection: covered by at least two waves for each poll series)

With respect to the decade-by-decade variation, the trends derived from the two poll series overlap significantly: for the ‘90s in 10 out of the 11 comparable pairs (with the sole exception of East Germany, where ARI_{ISSP} captures a 0.7% increase); for the 2000s in 16 out of 19 pairs, the exceptions being West Germany (whose ARI_{ISSP} rather suggests a plateau phase), Hungary (a 0.3% increase derived from the ISSP vs. a 2.1% decrease on the basis of EVS), respectively Latvia (increase of ARI_{EVS} vs. decrease of ARI_{ISSP}); these minor differences nonetheless fade away over the combined 1990-2008 timeframe, for which the trends derived from the two poll series coincide in all the 12 comparable cases.

Area-aggregated ARI comparison of religiosity trends

More intriguingly, an orienting, purely didactical, measuring of area average country ARIs allows two observations: firstly, for those Eastern European countries covered by the 1990 EVS wave, hereinafter referred to as “narrow Eastern Europe”, the ARI-expressed un-weighted aggregated religiosity has rather stagnated over the past decade; secondly, the entire, *i.e.* extended, Eastern Europe’ aggregated ARI value has increased, essentially equalizing the one of Western Europe, on behalf of exactly those countries for which 1990 data are not available:




Fig. 3: Area religiosity trends by average country- ARI_{EVS}

(Western Europe does not include here Luxembourg (not covered by the 1990 wave) and Norway (data missing for 1999); “Narrow Eastern Europe” = East Germany, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Romania, and Bulgaria; “Extended Eastern Europe” = “narrow Eastern Europe” plus Estonia, Lithuania, Croatia, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Greece, and Turkey.)

Also serving a strictly orienting purpose, a comparison of Western and “narrow” Eastern Europe religiosity trends over the past two decades along the area average values of all 18 inventoried items highlights a relevant difference in the composition of the trends in religiosity. Thus, the aggregate religious revival of the East, slowed down during the last decade, took place mainly on behalf of beliefs (except the one in sin, continuously decreasing) and affiliation components, and to a lesser degree on behalf of religious practice (comprising prayer activity and church attendance); by contrast, church guidance especially and, in weaker correlations, church confidence and the perceived importance of religious services varied in the opposite direction, thus signifying an area

revitalization that unfolded to a large extent outside the Church institutional setting²⁴.




Fig 4: A religiosity trend comparison of West and “narrow” East by average country values of ARI components includes Estonia; ** includes Estonia and Lithuania

	I.1	I.2	I.3	I.4	I.5	I.6	I.7	II.1	II.2	II.3	II.4a	II.4b	II.4c	II.4d	II.5a	II.5b	II.5c	III.
ARI _{NE}	1.0	1.0	.90	1.0	.80	.90	-.80	.70	.80	-.50	-.90	-.80	-.80	-.90	-.10	-.40	-.50	1.0
ARI _{WE}	1.0	1.0	.80	.50	1.0	-.70	-.56	.80	1.0	1.0	-.10	.70	1.0	.80	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

Table 7: Correlations of areas average country ARI trends with the corresponding 18 index components variation, 1990-2008

Comparatively, the aggregate religiosity decline of the West has been rather uniform along the index' components, except for the beliefs in hell and in sin, and, to an insignificant degree, church moral guidance, while generally speaking, the decline of the perceived guidance from the church in all four surveyed issues has been less steep, albeit having started from lower values in 1990.

Integrating the findings into the corresponding body of research literature and conclusions

When approximated by an aggregated religiosity index as the one I have developed, Western Europe's pattern of aggregated religiosity seems reasonably classifiable, at least at the population level²⁵, as "secularization" in the classic sense of the process whereby religious thinking/consciousness, practice/actions, and institutions "lose social significance"²⁶, although the patterns of religiosity seem indeed significantly differentiated from country to country²⁷ and even between decades.

Thus, while during the 1990s, most Western European countries continued their steady declining trend in religiosity already manifested in the 1980s, albeit at a lower overall pace, at least five states combined two exceptional clusters: the first one, grouping the Scandinavian, overwhelmingly Protestant, countries such as Denmark, Finland and Iceland witnessed an overall religious revival in all dimensions (practice and Church guidance included), except for religious affiliation, which slightly dropped, but remained extremely high in absolute values, confirming Grace Davie's reverted label "belonging without believing"²⁸ applied to the local reality.

The other cluster, comprising the Southern states of Italy and Portugal also witnessed an undisputable religious revitalization, manifested especially among their Catholic majorities, in a trend extensively documented by local authors²⁹, although the main factors of the trend were not identical: while in Italy, religious affiliation slightly decreased, but the remaining Catholics' religiosity uniformly increased along all other 17 ARI components, in Portugal the main factor has been a considerable increase of declared religious belonging.

Over the same timeframe, the measurement of Eastern Europe religiosity at an aggregate area level, suggesting a considerable religious revival, is rather deceiving; at a closer look, the nine countries covered by

all the last three EVS waves actually combine into two satisfactorily easy separable clusters: in the first one, corresponding to a narrow, working, definition of *Mitteleuropa* and grouping the Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, religiosity actually declined, from 1990 levels already below Western European averages (except for Poland), uniformly along church attendance, church confidence, church guidance, importance of religious services and religious affiliation, while beliefs and the binary measured activity of praying registered rather contradictory patterns.

A *contrario*, in the second cluster, encompassing rather eclectically from a religious and geographical point of view, Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania³⁰, and Slovakia³¹, the increase in religiosity has been both spectacular in terms of absolute variation and quasi-generalized along the 18 ARI components, the debatable case referring to the variables subsumed to church guidance.

Comparatively, the last decade witnessed a “mathematical” meeting of East and West in terms of area average ARIs (62.79 vs. 62.62), as a resultant of significantly diverse (sub-) area trends. Thus, the descending trend of the West of the ‘90s has been continued, consolidated and extended, covering inclusively the aforementioned five exceptions of the previous decade³², the only exception being the above-discussed case of the Netherlands. Except for church family life and social guidance plus the belief in Hell (which roughly stagnated in overall figures) and the actual increase of respondents considering that Church offers adequate answers to moral problems, religiosity declined by all the other ARI components.

In parallel, the religiosity pattern of the nine-country East European group of countries covered by the 1990 EVS wave confirmed, at least when judged by an area average ARI, my introductory hypothesis, in the sense that not only has the 1990s East-West trend discrepancy been significantly narrowed down, but the group’s aggregated ARI actually decreased over the last decade, albeit by a mere 0.83, from 58.26 to 57.43. This trend however represents the resultant of divergent evolutions within the aforementioned two subareas. Thus, in the narrow *Mitteleuropa* group, religiosity continued to decline, at an aggregated ARI rate almost equal to that in Western Europe, from 51.2 in 1999 to 48.5 in 2008³³, meaning a -5.3% drop, compared to -5.4% in the West (from 66.4 to 62.8). Slovenia provides the exception within the cluster, having registered an aggregated ARI increase.

Simultaneously, religiosity in Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia continued to increase in each case, but significantly slower than during the previous decade, in aggregate ARI variation of +3.1% (from 67.1 in 1999 to 69.2 in 2008)³⁴, compared to +25.3% during the 1990s. Regarding the variation in content of religiosity, while religious affiliation continued its positive trend, and beliefs kept their diverse pattern, practice, church guidance and religious services increases stopped and in many cases

actually engaged on a descending trend compared to the 1990s, suggesting a religiosity increasingly manifested outside of the Church setting.

Moreover, the 2008 ARI national values correlate at a not very high, but nevertheless noteworthy, degree with the same year's KOF globalization index calculated by the ETH Zürich:

Index Country	ARI _{EVS}	KOF Index of Globalization			
		Aggregate	Economic	Social	Political
Turkey	88.69	69.96	69.86	58.24	87.88
Romania	87.69	65.31	69.65	48.35	84.82
Poland	86.15	78.42	73.5	74.70	91.12
Greece	79.55	73.43	73.55	66.45	83.85
Lithuania	73.72	63.90	78.96	61.36	46.13
Croatia	73.09	70.17	77.20	63.70	69.92
Slovakia	72.35	75.82	79.32	79.59	65.07
Ukraine	70.20	64.57	62.36	57.68	78.22
Latvia	60.43	63.24	81.37	69.91	27.12
Russia	58.19	69.82	57.29	64.40	96.04
Slovenia	57.21	70.26	80.05	71.40	54.49
Bulgaria	56.53	64.35	69.81	54.88	70.89
Hungary	50.43	82.52	88.83	76.96	81.89
Estonia	36.54	72.18	90.76	74.41	42.14
Czech Rep.	29.07	85.51	87.69	84.91	83.27
correl.		-.3766	-.5467	-.5680	.2930

Table 8: Correlation of religiosity and globalization in Eastern Europe, 2008³⁵

The significant unknown element in this partially deciphered picture is represented by those Eastern European countries for which only 1999 and 2008 EVS data are available: Lithuania and Estonia in the Baltic area; Croatia in Central Europe; Greece and Turkey in South-Eastern Europe; and the former CSI countries Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. However, I argue that, except for Ukraine (where indirect comparisons of 1990s and 2000s data lead to rather contradictory conclusions³⁶) and Belarus (severely under-approached by Western sociologists for obvious reasons), and, arguably, Turkey³⁷, there are multiple direct and indirect reasons to assume that all other remaining countries fit into the two aforementioned Eastern European patterns of religiosity depending on their geographical position.

Specifically, Croatia respects entirely the Central European pattern not only when judging by other authors' findings³⁸, but also when examining its 1999-2008 religiosity content variation and negative trend, a "marker" of the *Mitteleuropa* cluster. Similarly, both direct figures³⁹, related to variation content and ARI variation rates, and indirect data provided by the field literature⁴⁰ suggest Estonia and Lithuania's perfect

fit into the Eastern European cluster, characterized by a 2000s slowing down of the previous decade's religious revival and a religiosity progressively manifested outside of the Church setting. Of the remaining five countries, the CSI countries' ARI high increase rates (18.3% in Russia; 18.7% in Belarus; 21.6% in Ukraine), similar to the one recorded in the non-CSI Eastern Europe during the 1990s, could *prima facie* suggest an area de-phasing, with the CSI area lagging behind the non-CSI by roughly a decade. However, it needs to be stressed that the former Soviet republics started their post-Communist transition from a completely different, almost unique background, characterized, especially in Russia, by a "total extermination of religion carried out"⁴¹ by the Communist regime, and as such from extremely low values of religiosity, with subsequently enough reasons to assume the 2000s ARI rates are lower than the corresponding ones of the 1990s⁴². For the particular case of Russia, this assumption is for instance verified by the ARI_{ISSP} values: 21.16 in the 1991 wave, 37.23 in 1998, respectively 39.30 in 2008 (see Table 6). Finally, Turkey (aside from its exceptionality) and Greece's ARI variations (+2.33, respectively +5.9%) and their variation content (see Table 5) also seem to fit the Eastern European pattern of religiosity.

Thus, following a purely numerical approach, based solely on poll respondents' answers, and aiming at an integrating holistic explanatory model, I would conclude that "East" and "West" have finally met in terms of religiosity during the globalization era, albeit their common frontier has changed, with the West, characterized by a continuous and relatively uniform content religiosity decline, currently incorporating in terms of religiosity the Central European countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, East Germany, Croatia, and, as an apparent exception, Slovenia. Comparatively, the new religiosity-defined "East" comprises, aside from the EU's current periphery (*i.e.* the Baltic countries, Slovakia⁴³, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece), the former CSI countries of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and, arguably, Turkey. Within the first cluster, the spectacular religious revival in the 1990s has been considerably slowed down over the last decade, suggesting an incipient plateau phase and marking an overall narrowing down the initial East-West trend discrepancy, while in the remaining countries, there are sufficient reasons to assume that the trends manifested over the past decade also represent a mitigation of those registered previous decade, as if globalization would have finally "stepped in".

To conclude, I should stress that the usefulness of the above developed and applied aggregated index of religiosity lies not so much in discovering previously unidentified trends, since it actually confirms much of the academic work in the field, but rather in facilitating a holistic diachronic approach of religiosity at country and area levels and in providing a concrete numerical expression to the trends in religiosity.

Appendix: Correlation matrixes for West's and narrow East's average country ARI components

Narrow Eastern Europe (9):

	I.1	I.2	I.3	I.4	I.5	I.6	I.7	II.1	II.2	II.3	II.4a	II.4b	II.4c	II.4d	II.5a	II.5b	II.5c	III.
I.1	1.0																	
I.2	1.0	1.0																
I.3	1.0	1.0	1.0															
I.4	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0														
I.5	.90	.90	1.0	.90	1.0													
I.6	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0												
I.7	-.90	-.88	-.96	-.92	-.99	-.97	1.0											
II.1	.80	.77	.90	.82	.98	.91	-.98	1.0										
II.2	.60	.70	.50	.60	.20	.40	-.20	.0	1.0									
II.3	-.67	-.63	-.80	-.70	-.92	-.81	.92	-.98	.17	1.0								
II.4a	-.97	-.95	-.99	-.98	-.98	-.99	.98	-.92	-.41	.83	1.0							
II.4b	-.93	-.90	-.98	-.94	-.99	-.98	.99	-.97	-.27	.90	.99	1.0						
II.4c	-.91	-.88	-.97	-.92	-.99	-.97	.99	-.98	-.22	.92	.98	.99	1.0					
II.4d	-.96	-.94	-.99	-.97	-.99	-.99	.98	-.94	-.37	.85	.99	.99	.99	1.0				
II.5a	-.30	-.20	-.40	-.30	-.60	-.50	.60	-.80	.60	.90	.50	.60	.60	.50	1.0			
II.5b	-.60	-.50	-.70	-.60	-.90	-.70	.90	-1.0	.30	1.0	.80	.80	.90	.80	.90	1.0		
II.5c	-.70	-.60	-.80	-.70	-.90	-.80	.90	-1.0	.20	1.0	.80	.90	.90	.90	.90	1.0	1.0	
III.	.99	.99	.97	.99	.88	.96	-.87	.76	.66	-.62	-.95	-.90	-.88	-.94	-.20	-.53	-.63	1.0
ARI	1.0	1.0	.90	1.0	.80	.90	-.80	.70	.80	-.50	-.90	-.80	-.80	-.90	-.10	-.40	-.50	1.0

Western Europe (16)

	I.1	I.2	I.3	I.4	I.5	I.6	I.7	II.1	II.2	II.3	II.4a	II.4b	II.4c	II.4d	II.5a	II.5b	II.5c	III.
I.1	1.0																	
I.2	.90	1.0																
I.3	1.0	1.0	1.0															
I.4	.70	.40	.90	1.0														
I.5	.90	1.0	.70	.40	1.0													
I.6	-.40	-.70	-.10	.30	-.80	1.0												
I.7	-.29	-.60	.00	.44	-.68	.99	1.0											
II.1	.94	.76	.99	.92	.69	-.07	.06	1.0										
II.2	.90	1.0	.70	.40	1.0	-.80	-.70	.70	1.0									
II.3	.95	.99	.81	.47	.99	-.69	-.58	.77	.99	1.0								
II.4a	-.43	-.10	-.68	-.93	.00	-.63	-.73	-.72	-.01	-.12	1.0							
II.4b	.45	.73	.17	-.28	.79	-.99	-.98	.11	.79	.72	.60	1.0						
II.4c	.84	.98	.64	.24	.99	-.84	-.76	.59	.99	.97	.12	.86	1.0					
II.4d	.64	.86	.38	-.05	.91	-.97	-.92	.33	.90	.85	.41	.97	.95	1.0				
II.5a	1.0	.90	1.0	.80	.80	-.30	-.20	1.0	.80	.90	-.60	.30	.80	.50	1.0			
II.5b	1.0	1.0	.90	.60	1.0	-.60	-.50	.80	1.0	1.0	-.20	.60	.90	.80	.90	1.0		
II.5c	.90	1.0	.80	.50	1.0	-.70	-.60	.80	1.0	1.0	-.10	.70	1.0	.90	.90	1.0	1.0	
III	.99	.98	.90	.62	.96	-.55	-.43	.87	.96	.98	-.30	.58	.91	.75	.96	.99	.98	1.0
ARI	1.0	1.0	.80	.50	1.0	-.70	-.56	.80	1.0	1.0	-.10	.70	1.0	.80	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

Notes

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¹ Austin Harrington, Barbara L. Marshall and Hans-Peter Müller, *Encyclopedia of Social Theory* (London: Routledge, 2006), 536.

² See, among them: Heiner Meulemann, "Enforced Secularization – Spontaneous Revival? Religious Belief, Unbelief, Uncertainty and Indifference in East and West European countries, 1991-1998", *European Sociological Review*, 20, 1 (2005): 47-61; Miklós Tomka, "Is Conventional Sociology of Religion Able to Deal with Differences between Eastern and Western European Developments?", *Social Compass*, 53, 2 (2006): 251-265; Hans Knipperberg, "The Political Geography of Religion: Historical State-Church Relations in Europe and Recent Challenges", *GeoJournal*, 67, 4 (2006): 253-265.

³ In an interpretation of globalization as an accelerated and widespread phase of modernization encompassing broadly all factors identified by adherents to the secularization paradigm: rationality, scientism, a secular institutional architecture of states, urbanization, industrialization, inter-religious contact and pluralism, mass education, etc. (see, *inter alia*, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁴ Database at

<http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fCatalog/Catalog5>

⁵ Siobhan McAndrew and David Voas, "Measuring Religiosity Using Surveys", *Survey Question Bank: Topic Overview* 4 (2011): 2.

⁶ Among the noteworthy alternatives pleading in favor of a unidimensional approach focusing on beliefs as the core component, the best known scholars are arguably Richard R. Clayton ("5-D or 1?", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 10 (1971): 37-40) and coauthor James W. Gladden ("The Five Dimensions of Religiosity: Toward Demythologizing a Sacred Artifact", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 13, 2 (1974): 135-43).

⁷ Charles Y. Glock, "On the Study of Religious Commitment", *Religious Education* 57, 4 (1962): 98-110. For the same dimensions, see Rodney Stark and Charles Y. Glock, *American Piety: The Nature of Religious Commitment* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968).

⁸ According to William H. Swatos Jr., "Religiosity", in *Encyclopedia of Religion and Society*, ed. William H. Swatos Jr. (Berkeley, CA: AltaMira Press, 1998), 406. For Fukuyama's model in four dimensions (creedal, devotional, cultic, and cognitive), developed on the basis of his PhD thesis, see Yoshio Fukuyama, "The Major Dimensions of Church Membership", *Review of Religious Research* 2 (1961): 154-161.

⁹ Gerhard E. Lenski, *The Religious Factor: A Sociological Study of Religion's Impact on Politics, Economics and Family Life* (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1961).

¹⁰ Who also offer a remarkably synoptic overview of the main religiosity models developed up to their moment of writing. See Marie Cornwall *et al.*, "The Dimensions of Religiosity: A Conceptual Model with an Empirical Test". *Review of Religious Research* 27, 3 (1986): 226-244.

¹¹ See McAndrew and Voas, 3; Hans Schilderman, (ed.) *Discourse in Ritual Studies (Empirical Studies in Theology)* (Leiden: BRILL, 2007), 22-24; or Francesco Zaccaria (*Participation and Beliefs in Popular Religiosity: An Empirical-Theological Exploration among Italian Catholics*, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2010), who separates belonging and ritualizing (as comprising the objective dimension of religiosity) from beliefs (as subjective).

¹² The index developed here represents an extended and refined version of a previous one elaborated in 2012 (See Ionuț Apahideanu, "Tendințe ale religiozității în Europa ultimelor trei decenii: o abordare cantitativă", *Revista internațională de psihologie politică și societală* 3, 1 (2012): 61-2).

¹³ The number was limited by the selection criteria of having been measured over at least three EVS waves.

¹⁴ Selecting randomly as an example Italy within the second EVS wave (1999), where 93.5% of the valid answers offering respondents declared they believed in God, 85.8% were defining themselves as religious persons, etc., the corresponding index is calculated as: $ARI = [(33.33/2) * 93.5 + (33.33/2/6) * 85.8 + (33.33/2/6) * (9.4+11.0+14.9+9.5+33.1) + (33.33/2/6) * 72.8 + (33.33/2/6) * 58.7 + (33.33/2/6) * 49.0 + (33.33/2/6) * 73.2 + (33.33/3) * 78.9 + (33.33/3) * (10.2+30.3+13.2) + (33.33/3/3) * (27.0+40.1) + (33.33/3/12) * 61.8 + (33.33/3/12) * 47.7 + (33.33/3/12) * 72.4 + (33.33/3/12) * 43.5 + (33.33/3/9) * 89.0 + (33.33/3/9) * 84.9 + (33.33/3/9) * 89.4 + 33.33 * 82.2] / 100 = 77.13$.

¹⁵ For various approaches and terminological versions of this dichotomy, see, *inter alia*, the above quoted works of Gerhard Lenski (1961), Cornwall *et al.* (1986), Zaccaria (2010), or: James Dittes ("Two Issues in Measuring Religion", in *Research on Religious Development*, ed. M.P. Strommen (New York: Hawthorne, 1971)), who dissociates between on the one hand a public, social, formalized and institution-guided and directed dimension and on the other hand a subjective one comprising attitudes, values, commitments, etc.; James E. Davidson ("Socio-Economic Status and Ten Dimensions of Religious Commitment", *Sociology and Social Research* 61 (1977): 462-485), who reinforces the public vs. private delineation; or Andrew Greeley (*The Denominational Society* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1972)), Wade Clark Roof ("Concepts and Indicators of Religious Commitment: A Critical Review", in *The Religious Dimension: New Directions in Quantitative Research*, ed. Robert Wuthnow (New York: Academic Press, 1979), 17-45), respectively Grace Davies (*Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing Without Belonging* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), who all differentiate between "believing" (or "meaning") and "belonging".

¹⁶ Defined as "a generalized and organized conception, influencing behavior, or nature, of man's place in it, of man's relation to man, and of the desirable and undesirable as they may relate to man-environment and interhuman relations" (Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value Orientations in The Theory of Action: An Exploration in Definition and Classification", in *Toward a General Theory of Action*, eds. Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971: 388-433), 411).

¹⁷ For a noteworthy Romanian alternative proposal for measuring religious phenomena based on objective data, unfortunately quasi-impossible to be applied at a European cross-national level, see Claudiu Herțeliu ("Statistical Indicators System regarding Religious Phenomena", *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* (6, 16 (2007): 115-131)), who designs an integrated system comprising six series of indicators addressing: context; religious system (grouping ten

indicators: number of divine persons; birth rituals; marriage rituals; mixed marriages; rites for death; woman ordaining; active, respectively passive, methods to promote “the truth”; iconography type); level and structure; participation; resources; quality, efficiency and results/outcomes.

¹⁸ Robert N. Bellah *et al.*, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).

¹⁹ For an inventory of a dozen such more or less synonymous terms that have been advanced within the field literature over the last decades, see Ionuț Apahideanu, “An Empirical Revisiting of the Secularization Debate at the Micro Level: Europe’s Heterodox Religiosity over the Last Two Decades”, *Euro Polis* 7, 1 (2013): 37-73.

²⁰ In Finland’s case from 88.9 to 88.3%.

²¹ Andrew M. Greeley, *Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium: A Sociological Profile* (New Brunswick; London: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 202.

²² J.W. Becker and R. Vink, *Secularisatie in Nederland, 1966-1991. De verandering van opvattingen en enkele gedragingen* (Rijswijk: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 1994), 175-180.

²³ The inferior values in the ISSP columns are attributable mainly to a higher weight of practice within the index. ARI_{ISSP}’s components and weights were: I.1 belief in God (33.3/8% within ARI); I.2. self-defining as religious (33.3/8%); I.3. belief in life after death (33.3/8%); I.4. belief in Heaven (33.3/8%); I.5. belief in Hell; I.6. belief in religious miracles (33.3/8%); I.7. belief in a personally concerned God (33.3/8%); I.8. God as source of life meaning (33.3/8%); II.1. frequency of prayer (33.3/3%); II.2. frequency of religious service attendance; II.3. participation in church activities or organizations; III. Affiliation to a religious denomination (33.3%). For more details about the measurement, see Apahideanu, “Tendințe ale...”, 76.

²⁴ The significant exception being Lithuania, where almost all variables related to Church (except for ordinary religious service attendance) registered increases over the last decade. For an explanation of the Lithuanian Church’s privileged domestic perception and its link to national identity, see for instance Steve Bruce, “The Supply-side Model of Religion: The Nordic and Baltic States”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 39, 1 (2001): 32-47.

²⁵ Following the secularization levels distinction of C. John Sommerville (“Secular Society/Religious Population. Our Tacit Rules for Using the Term Secularization”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 37, 2 (1998): 249-253).

²⁶ Bryan R. Wilson, *Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment* (London: C.A. Watts, 1966), 15, and *Religion in Sociological Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), xiv, 49.

²⁷ Gert Pickel, Detlef Pollack and Olaf Müller, “Differentiated Secularization in Europe: Comparative Results”, in *The Social Significance of Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Secularization, Individualization and Pluralization*, eds. Detlef Pollack, Olaf Müller, and Gert Pickel (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2012) 229-256; Andrew M. Greeley, *Religion in Europe...*

²⁸ Grace Davie, “Vicarious Religion: A Methodological Challenge”, in *Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives*, ed. Nancy T. Ammerman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 25.

²⁹ For Italy, see for instance Massimo Introvigne and Rodney Stark, “Religious Competition and Revival in Italy: Exploring European Exceptionalism”, *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* 1, 1 (2005): 1-18. Portugal’s religious revival has been addressed by the case study of Helena Vilaça (“Portugal: Secularization and Religious Vitality of the Roman Catholic Church in a Southern European Country”, in *The Social Significance of Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Secularization, Individualization and Pluralization*, ed. Detlef Pollack, Olaf Müller, and Gert Pickel (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 77-94).

³⁰ The remarkably high levels of religiosity registered in Romania in particular have been analyzed in several, not solely quantitative, studies, among which I would selectively mention those of: M. Voicu (*România religioasă* (Iași: Institutul European, 2007)), who investigates the religiosity revival of the 1990s descriptively and explicatively; M. Voicu and A. Constantin (“Religious revival in Romania: Between Cohort Replacement and Contextual Changes”, in *Transformations of Religiosity: Religion and Religiosity in Eastern Europe 1989-2010*, eds. G. Pickel and K. Sammet (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2012), 155-171), who explore the factors of the religious revitalization in depth; C. Herțeliu and M.A. Fărcășanu (“The Religious Affiliation Structure of the Villages from Romania”, *Journal of Applied Quantitative Methods* 6, 1 (2011): 109-116), who analyze the religious affiliation component of religiosity in the rural area; S. Gog (“The Construction of the Religious Space in post-Socialist Romania”. *Journal for the Studies of Religions and Ideologies* 5, 15 (2006): 37-53), who explains Romania’s remarkably high religiosity in terms of the low degree of modernization within its social system); or D. Șandor and M. Popescu (“Religiosity and Values in Romania”, *Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences* 22, E (2008): 171-180), who correlate religiosity with attitudes and values, to reach the conclusion that religiosity is not fostering the desired social values, somewhat contrary to P. Iluț and M. Nistor (“Some Aspects of the Relationship between Basic Human Values and Religiosity in Romania”, *Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology* 8, 2 (2011): 159-176), who, instrumenting the fourth EVS wave, identify a relatively strong correlation between Romanians’ religiosity and their openness to chance and to self-enhancement values.

³¹ For an explanation of the *prima facie* exception of Slovakia, which belongs geographically to the Central European cluster, alongside the Czech Republic, see Paul Froese, “Secular Czechs and Devoted Slovaks: Explaining Religious Differences”, *Review of Religious Research* 46, 3 (2005): 269-283.

³² For a confirmation of Italy’s inverted “V”-shaped trend, see a comparison of two national polls, one of 1994, the other of 2007, in Franco Garelli, “Flexible Catholicism, Religion and the Church: The Italian Case”, *Religions* 4 (2013): 1-13, and the same author’s *Religione all’italiana* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011).

³³ Or, if Croatia is included, from 55.5 in 1999 to 52.6 in 2008, meaning a -5.2% variation.

³⁴ Or from 62.4 in 1999 to 64.5 in 2008, meaning a +3.4% variation (if Estonia and Lithuania are included)

³⁵ Archive of the globalization indexes available at <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/>.

³⁶ The only consensual conclusion referring to the spectacular magnitude of the religious syncretism phenomenon (see Olaf Müller, “Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe: Results from the PCE Survey”, in *Religion and Patterns of Social*

Transformation, eds. Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, Siniša Zrinščak, and Irena Borowik (Zagreb: Institute for Social Research, 2004), 61-78. For data covering the '90s, see Alexei D. Krindatch, "Religion in Postsoviet Ukraine as a Factor in Regional, Ethno-Cultural and Political Diversity", *Religion, State and Society* 31 (2003): 37-73, or Dariusz Wojakowski, "Life in Religious Pluralism: The Religious Situation in the Polish-Ukrainian Borderland Area", *Religion, State and Society* 31, 1(2003): 37-73.

³⁷ Because of at least three reasons: its unique status of a Muslim-majority country among the countries surveyed; its spectacular absolute values of religiosity (see, by comparison, the religiosity values of Albania and Azerbaijan within the 2008 EVS survey); its unique domestic political context, of a 10-year incumbent quasi-Islamist government (for more details, see Zeynep Taydas, Yasemin Akbaba and Minion K.C. Morrison, "Did Secularism Fail? The Rise of Religion in Turkish Politics", *Politics and Religion* 5 (2012), 528-554).

³⁸ See for instance Krunoslav Nikodem and Siniša Zrinščak, "Croatia's Religious Story: The Coexistence of Institutionalized and Individualized Religiosity", in *The Social Significance of Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Secularization, Individualization and Pluralization*, eds. Detlef Pollack, Olaf Müller, and Gert Pickel (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 207-228.

³⁹ A few of the 18 questions surveyed here were also addressed in Estonia and Lithuania over the 1990 EVS wave.

⁴⁰ For Estonia, see Eva-Liisa Jaanus, "Some Aspects of Religiosity in Estonia", in *The Social Significance of Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Secularization, Individualization and Pluralization*, eds. Detlef Pollack, Olaf Müller, and Gert Pickel (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 167-186, and Jaanus Plaat, "Christian and Non-Christian Religiosity in Estonia and East-Virumaa in the 1990s: Comparison of Estonians and other Ethnic Groups", *Pro Ethnologia* 14 (2002): 97-134. For Lithuania, see Aida Savicka, (ed.) *Lithuania: Identity and Values (Lithuanian Philosophical Studies V)*. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2007.

⁴¹ Sergey Filatov, "Orthodoxy in Russia: Port-atheistic Faith", *Studies in World Christianity* 14, 3 (2008): 187.

⁴² For more details, see Paul Froese, "Forced Secularization in Soviet Russia: Why and Atheistic Monopoly Failed", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 43, 1 (2004): 154-161, and Sergei Filatov and Roman Lunkin, "Statistics on Religion in Russia: The Reality behind the Figures", *Religion, State and Society* 34, 1 (2006): 33-49.

⁴³ A country which could alternatively be classified as a second exception within the *Mitteleuropa* cluster.

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*** Leibniz Institute for Social Sciences – database of multiple EVS, EBM and ISSP poll waves (operational at <http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp>)